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Book Review: Trading Secrets: Spies and Intelligence in an
Age of Terror
In Trading Secrets, former Financial Times security correspondent Mark Huband aims to
provide a unique and controversial assessment of the ability of the major intelligence agencies
to combat the threat of twenty-first century terrorism. With access to intelligence officers from
Rome to Kabul and from Khartoum to Guantanamo Bay, Huband covers how spies created
secret channels to the IRA, deceived Iran’s terrorist allies, frequently attempted to infiltrate al-
Qaeda, and forced Libya to abandon its nuclear weapons. Julia Muravska finds the accounts
to be somewhat sensationalist in parts, but mostly valuable and intriguing.
Trading Secrets: Spies and Intelligence in an Age of Terror. Mark
Huband. IB Tauris. November 2012.
Find this book: 
Anyone with an interest in international af f airs may have observed the
seeming “rediscovery” of  Machiavelli in recent years, as excerpts and
ref erences of  the great polit ical philosopher’s writ ings were seized upon
f or apparently catchy, yet sophisticated “hooks” of  f oreign policy books,
media articles, and opinion pieces. Mark Huband’s latest work, Trading
Secrets: Spies and Intelligence in an Age of Terror is no exception. The
book begins with quotes f rom Machiavelli’s The Art of War  and The Prince
to highlight the enduring importance of  “the art of  surprise” to the craf t
of  intelligence operatives, the aims of  polit ical leaders, and the plans of
military of f icers.
It is a testament to Huband’s sharp judgement and eloquent expression
that, unlike many “Machiavelli pieces”, his ref erences are both relevant to
the post-9/11 international security environment on which he f ocuses and illustrative of  his main
arguments. Indeed, surprise—and specif ically the ability to wield it against an enemy ef f ectively,
as “the most potent weapon of  all”—is the major theme of  Huband’s book. The power to
surprise is what the intelligence community spends its lif e attempting to keep on its side and away f rom the
enemy’s grasp.
Drawing on his extensive journalistic career,  and with six authored books and one edited volume on topics
ranging f rom post-Cold War Af rica to polit ical Islam already to his name, Mark Huband has written about
and met “rebel leaders, kings, presidents, dictators, f undamentalists, terrorists and f reedom f ighters” (p.
58). Yet, by his own admission, all along he was missing “the story…beneath the surf ace.” This is the story
of  Trading Secrets: it  is one of  secret intelligence as it developed into the f orm we recognise today, its
impact on the events and f oreign policy decisions shaping the post-9/11 world, and the craf t of  the spies
and spooks who dominate its plot.
Huband traces the origin of  “modern spy-craf t”—at its heart,  “knowing the enemy better than he knows
you, while ensuring that he doesn’t know how much you know about him” (p. 17)—to Britain’s two century-
long campaign against persistently rebellious Ireland beginning in 1798. The vast reach of  the Brit ish empire
helped disseminate the lessons learned by the “f irst global intelligence service” throughout the world’s
“intelligence machinery” (p. 7). Fundamental to its f unctioning was the existence of  a market in which
intelligence secrets could always be traded by those willing to sell f or the price the spies were able to pay.
The Cold War recast the market of  intelligence secrets in an ideological, zero-sum light, and inf used it with
nuclear weapons, proxy wars, and cat-and-mouse spying tactics f ocused on misinf ormation, but it did not
alter the underlying market structure: there were still those willing to sell, on both sides of  the Iron Curtain.
What truly overturned this globe-spanning trading edif ice of  spying was the violent arrival of  religiously
extremist transnational terrorism, with Al-Qaeda at the helm. The attacks of  9/11 brought painf ully to the
f ore what Huband sees as a “revolution”  in spy-craf t – the arrival of  an amorphous, Medusa- like enemy
that had no polit ical master among governments and would accept no price, however enticing, f or its
secrets.  Moreover, 9/11 demonstrated that the power of  surprise could elude the most powerf ul state, its
Western allies, and the intelligence agencies tasked with harnessing it. Surprise was on the side of  the
terrorists who would not be bought (p. 137).
Presented with this “dry” market of  secrets, bruised and f acing a crisis of  legit imacy due to their f ailure to
f oresee, much less disrupt, the attacks of  9/11, the intelligence agencies of  today’s imperial power,
together with its allies, changed the rules. Once they identif ied their “sources”, the post-9/11 spies and the
CIA in particular would “capture those they might once have recruited, incarcerate those they might have
once permitted to ‘run’, and brutalise those they might have once coaxed and cajoled” (p. 138).  This is the
story told in Huband’s chapter ‘Prisoners,’ in which he gives a f irst-hand account,  buttressed by
conversations with military personnel and senior intelligence of f icials, of  the epicentre of  post 9/11
intelligence gathering taking place at Guantanamo Bay.  Within its “secured” innards that held “enemy
combatants”  of  the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT),  the “limits to which a democracy could go to
def end itself ” were being redef ined (p. 1 46).
And in this process “of f  came the mask; of f  came the gloves”  of  the West’s intelligence agencies, as
Guantanamo became a “resource…dipped into by all of  the world’s intelligence agencies” (p. 150). This
“power” rather than the “weapon” of  intelligence not only proved intoxicating and easily abused, but also,
as Huband argues, conveniently manipulated to “create truths” and “make history” –and in the case of  the
disastrous 2003 invasion of  Iraq by the US- and UK-led ‘Coalit ion of  the Willing,”  that “history” was war (p.
171). In the chapter ‘Know Your Enemy’  Huband continues the story of  the danger of  intelligence, this t ime
by showing how “the power of  secrets was used to launch a war” meant to unearth the non-existent WMDs
supposedly hoarded by the Saddam Regime (p. 179).
Iraq and Guantanamo point to the larger stories told by Huband on the elusiveness of  “truth” and the
dif f iculty of  injecting humanitarianism into f oreign policy. A f undamental part of  this story is what
intelligence is and is not-  as Huband’s examples emphasise, it is most certainly not a blueprint f or polit ical
action. Yet, what the myths around “spy-craf t” and its masters have dangerously allowed them to overlook
is the need to not only know “what people are up to,” but to understand their intent, the why as well as the
what (p. 21).
Perhaps these stories will be f amiliar. And readers of  Trading Secrets should remember that, contrary to
Huband’s view, the spy agencies of  the UK and the US  do not constitute the entirety of  the “global spy-
craf t;” there are Middle Eastern, Chinese, and Russian ways of  trading secrets to name but a f ew. The
author ’s account of  the goings-on in Guantanamo verges on the sensationalist. Nevertheless, Huband
delivers his insights with a wealth of  f irst-hand accounts and tit illating statements directly f rom the “f oot
soldiers of  f oreign policy” about whom he writes. And this, together with a sophisticated account of  both
their successes and f ailures in maintaining the power of  surprise through uncertainty, is what makes his
work valuable and intriguing.
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